An Analysis of Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 48 1979 to Anti-Terrorism Bill 2023
For any sovereign Nation, safeguarding National security is of paramount importance in ensuring due recognition and respect for the rights and freedom of its people. In the context of Sri Lanka, a Nation that has navigated a long history of internal civil conflict and violence, the establishment of a robust legal framework is not merely a legislative choice rather, the Anti-Terrorism Bill (2023) defines it as the “foremost duty of the Government to protect its territory, people, and property from the scourge of terrorism”. Historically, the State's security mission was underpinned by the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No. 48 of 1979 (PTA). Castle (2022) characterises this legislation as a "wartime prevention measure” enacted to address an era in which the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1979) maintained that "public order" was being "endangered" by groups "that advocate the use of force"
The Anti-Terrorism Bill (2023) represents the legal context designed to combat "terrorism in its various forms and manifestations" in the 21st century. Furthermore, the Anti-Terrorism Bill (2023) aims to modernise the State's administration of criminal justice against terrorism by addressing contemporary threats, including digital sabotage and offences committed within or outside Sri Lanka. By reconciling the obligation to defend the territory with the requirements of the due process of law the State can affirm that increased legislative reach serves to strengthen the long-term democratic resilience of the Republic.
The Centre for Policy Alternatives (2023) observes the Sri Lankan legislature originally characterised the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) as a temporary provision, suggesting its primary function was securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedom of the people. Castle (2022) notes that this period of provisional authority ended in 1982 when the State converted the Act into permanent legislation, formalising a legal system focused on the detection, identification, and apprehension of any individual allegedly associated with unlawful activity that threatened the fabric of the Republic. This shift moving from crisis management to a permanent criminal justice architecture redefines National security not as a temporary interruption of norms, but as the enduring basis upon which the Republic’s sovereignty and the people’s freedom is concurrently safeguarded
The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) has functioned for over four decades as a primary mechanism of National defence. This as specified in the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1979), grants the State ‘broad powers in respect of arrests, searches and seizure of documents or things without a warrant’. This basis underscored the dire need of National security to be proactive, that the State must possess the agility to detect and identify threats before they result in irreparable harm to the community.
By formalising a specialised system for the "detection, identification, apprehension, arrest, detention, investigation, prosecution and punishment” of offenders, Anti-Terrorism Bill (2023) seeks to reclaim a sense of order that Manoharan (2006) argues was perceived as being unable to sustain against the "rising sophistication of militancy". However, this transition also reveals a deeper reality; when ordinary law is viewed as insufficient, the State often turns to complex legal frameworks not only to manage violence, but to reaffirm its authority and public legitimacy during periods of insecurity.
The transition to the Anti-Terrorism Bill (2023) marks a proactive refinement of Sri Lanka’s security doctrine, designed to meet modern practices and requirements. A primary feature of the draft, as outlined in the Anti-Terrorism Bill (2023), is its explicit focus on digital vulnerabilities, criminalising the "serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with, any electronic or automated or computerised system" as well as disruptions to any "frequency-based transmission system". Nauf1 (2025) highlights that these modernised provisions aim to secure the Nation against attacks enabled by cyberspace or Artificial intelligence (AI) that seek to undermine the country’s political, economic, social, constitutional, or environmental stability. This development suggests that contemporary counter-terrorism is no longer confined to controlling physical violence, but increasingly concerns the protection of National stability within digital and networked spaces, where disruption can be damaging as conventional attacks.
Furthermore, the Anti-Terrorism Bill (2023) introduces several refined procedural standards that enhance the effectiveness and professionalism of the security mandate. The Bill empowers not only the police but also members of the armed forces and the coast guard to take necessary measures to prevent terrorist offences. This provides the State with the authority to act in or over the territorial waters of Sri Lanka as well as within the National airspace, ensuring a comprehensive response capability across the Republic's entire jurisdiction, as established in the Anti-Terrorism Bill (2023).This expansion reflects a strategic shift from a land-centred security model to an integrated territorial doctrine, where National defence is understood as the simultaneous protection of land, sea, air, and the critical spaces through which modern threats now move.
The Centre for Policy Alternatives (2023) observes the 2023 Anti-Terrorism Bill establishes a legal outline where "only Statements given before a Magistrate will be admissible as evidence in court". This procedural standard is codified in Clause 77 of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (2023), which mandates that a "Statement made by any person to a Magistrate under this Act shall be admissible against such person" provided that judicial medical examinations and other statutory preconditions are satisfied. Perera (2023) notes that this requirement represents one of the proposed legislation's improvements, especially in terms of due process. By ensuring that evidence is recorded under judicial supervision, the State aims to secure convictions through information of high reliability, an approach that Manoharan (2006) argues is intended to increase "public faith in the Government" and the broader "criminal justice system”. By institutionalising judicial oversight at the earliest evidentiary stage, the State establishes that the ultimate preservation of the Republic is no longer the result of a temporary suspension of legal norms, but the continuous outcome of a durable administrative architecture.
The Preamble of the Anti- Terrorism Bill (2023) asserts that terrorism has ‘retarded National development’ and “seriously threatened the sovereignty and territorial integrity”. From a strategic standpoint, the Bill operates on the premise that National security is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of all other civil and political rights. By providing the State with tools such as “Proscription Orders” against organisations and “Curfew Orders prevent widespread systematic offences”, the Anti-Terrorism Bill (2023) creates a comprehensive protective outline. Such authority is presented as necessary for the Republic to fulfil its pledge to "protect other sovereign Nations and their people from the scourge of acts of terrorism" while maintaining a commitment to the "just and fair application" of the criminal justice system. By formalising specialised protective mechanisms within a permanent criminal justice framework, the State effectively establishes that a durable and high-readiness security architecture is the essential prerequisite for the consistent preservation of sovereignty and the enduring realisation of the people’s constitutional freedoms.
While the Anti-Terrorism Bill (2023) is presented as a modernisation of the security mandate, Nauf1 (2025) notes that its compatibility with the constitutional guarantee of "freedom from arbitrary detention" remains a subject of significant legal debate. Although the draft requires suspects to appear before a judicial officer, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2026) characterises this participation as "largely passive," with the court often restricted to "verifying the welfare of the detainee rather than probing the legality or necessity of arrest and detention". Under Clause 28(2)(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (2023), if an executive official has issued a Detention Order (DO), the Magistrate is mandated to "make an order to give effect to such Detention Order". Critics maintain that this framework "appears not to provide for any competence of the Magistrate to review the lawfulness of the detention," an arrangement that potentially "challenges the separation of powers that is central to a democratic system. This procedural dynamic signifies a strategic evolution where the maturation of a security mandate is defined by the search for a durable equilibrium between specialised authority and role of the judiciary. By internalising judicial oversight as an active component of National defence, the State can ensure that its legal framework possesses the institutional legitimacy required for a "criminal justice model" to strengthen the long-term resilience of the Republic.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR] (2026) notes that the Anti-Terrorism Bill (2023) grants "members of the police and the armed forces broad powers to stop, question, enter and search any premises or land, and arrest and detain" individuals suspected of offences. A specific point of concern, as established in the Anti-Terrorism Bill (2023), is the provision allowing military or coast guard personnel to detain a suspect in their custody for a period not exceeding twenty-four hours before the individual is transferred to the police. Since military personnel are typically trained for an external security role rather than civilian law enforcement, Manoharan (2006) and the OHCHR (2026) observe that this arrangement lacks "effective civilian oversight" and increases the "risk of serious human rights violations, including torture and other forms of ill-treatment". To prevent the "arbitrary deprivation of liberty," the OHCHR (2026) argues that all such enforcement actions must be subject to "immediate judicial scrutiny from the outset". To ensure that the modernisation of the State's protective architecture remains durable, it is essential that the expansion of jurisdictional reach be concurrently supported by specialised civilian counter-terrorism operations training integrated with human rights compliance frameworks for military and coast guard personnel.
By internalising the principles of military justice within the mission, the State can ensure that enforcement agility and legal accountability function as complementary and mutually reinforcing objectives, ultimately strengthening the long-term democratic resilience of the Nation.
The evolution from the Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 48 of 1979 to the Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2023 represents a proactive and necessary refinement of Sri Lanka’s security mandate. The ATB 2023 does not merely replace the old law; it modernises it by introducing a comprehensive system for the administration of justice that prioritises State protection while enhancing procedural integrity. This legislative proposal establishes a more permanent measure for National defence that is much more detailed in defining the Republic's security functions. By implementing an updated system for the administration of criminal justice against terrorism, the State seeks to harmonise international norms and standards with specific domestic needs. Future progress should focus on developing remedial legal provisions to safeguard the fundamental human rights of all citizens. By striving to find a proper equilibrium between security considerations and protection of fundamental rights, Sri Lanka is positioning itself to effectively secure the long-term stability and development of the country.
R. M. Sherai Fonseka is a research intern at the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) functioning under the Ministry of Defence. The opinions are her own and not necessarily a reflection of the Institute or Ministry